How to push Turkey to recognize Armenian genocide?

In years, April 24 of 2012 has been one of the calmest anniversary day of World War I-era killings of Armenians in 1915, which Armenians call genocide.

In sharp contrast to previous years, where Turkey invested much diplomatic effort in Western countries to push politicians to avoid uttering the word "genocide" while marking the 1915 tragedy, April 24 this year is silent. In previous years, Armenians worldwide were pushing the issue forward while Turkey was defiant, wasting too much of its energy and time for this. But no doubt Armenians are working tooth and nail to make a massive push in 2015, in the 100th anniversary of the tragedy, that will become a huge headache for Turkey and its allies. 

Armenian genocide is not a certified, proved and commonly accepted axiom like Holocaust or Rwandan genocide. It is also different from deliberate and open genocides such as Chinese mass killings by Japan in 1930s, Nazi Holocaust in Poland or French atrocities in Algeria. In all of these cases, a foreign invading army deliberately and systematically killed their enemies, regardless of their gender or age. 1915 tragedy is different and more light needs to be shed on this particular event to fully understand this piece of history. The primary reason why 1915 tragedy is not openly debated or discussed in public is both Armenia’s and Turkey’s refusal to do so. Turkey instead urges historians, researchers to investigate the matter and pledges to open its archives for such an initiative. It earlier said it is ready to accept whatever historians, also from Armenia, come up with as a result of the research.

Armenia says researching this matter will dilute the issue of genocide and will hurt feelings of relatives of victims. This is astonishing. What about feelings of Khojaly survivors, who have seen men, women and children killed in front of their eyes just only 20 years ago by Armenian forces in Western Azerbaijan? Why do Armenians today deny that such a tragedy even took place? Do Azerbaijanis feelings count when Armenians question one of the worst massacres in the post-Cold War period?

The matter is largely have to do with national pride of both states, much less what really happened in 1915 in eastern Turkey. It is simply unacceptable for Turkey to spin stories it has taught its students about the heroic struggle of its nationals during the War of Independence. Domestic politics also played a key role in blocking the discussion of such a sensitive issue and most nationalist political groups in Turkey are exploiting Azerbaijan’s war with Armenia to block such debates. But what to do?

The road map is simple: Turkey will be more open and compromising if Armenia decides to withdraw its troops from occupied Azerbaijani territories. It will create an unprecedented opportunity for Turkey and Armenia to bury a century-long hostilities and eventually openly debate what happened in 1915. In this case, Turkey won’t face nationalist backlash at home and pressure from Azerbaijan to compromise on this issue.

Turks and Azerbaijanis point to atrocities committed by Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh in early 1990s while they are trying to counter Armenian genocide claims. Occupation in Karabakh remains the biggest obstacle to solve this thorny genocide issue peacefully and rapidly. It should also be remembered that Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process in 2009, which also included the establishing of a commission made up of historians tasked with investigating the tragedy, collapsed due to the brewing nature of Armenian occupation of some 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory.

Unless Armenia ends its occupation of Western Azerbaijan, there is little hope, if any, Armenians and Turks will frankly discuss what happened a century ago and face their truly painful history where everyone suffered to a certain degree.

Why can't Turkey rescue its missing journalists in Syria?

It would definitely be unfair to level criticisms against the Turkish government for failing to spot the whereabouts of two missing Turkish journalists from Turkey's Milat daily and Gerçek Hayat magazine. But Turkey's refusal to talk to Syrian authorities may partially explain why the journalists are still missing.

The journalists went missing a month ago and many rumors surfaced regarding the fate of these journalists. Turkey's state news agency then claimed the journalists were handed down to the Syrian intelligence by Shabiha militias in Idlib. It was not confirmed by the Turkish government. 

It was not smart on the side of journalists to travel to Syria. One of my colleagues told me that one of the missing journalists are known as popular critic of Assad and has been an activist both in Syria and in Turkey for years. It is not surprising that Assad regime categorized him and jailed when they had a chance.

Although Turkish diplomats said 25 days ago that they have contacted their Syrian counterparts regarding the journalists, there have not been any statements in this respect almost for weeks.

Part of the problem -- and I underline the word "part" here -- is Turkey's quick dumping of Syria's embattled President Bashar al-Assad. It is not surprising that Assad is a liar and very good at deceiving his counterparts and making virtuoso maneuvers that would favor his regime in the face of a 13-month bloody uprising in his country.

But is it really the reason of not talking to him? Is being honest in negotiations an essential and necessary part of diplomatic talks? Diplomacy is itself an art of manipulation and an overture through a range of ways, including deception, to gain a favorable outcome. This is what Assad has been doing all along. Turkey was expecting a different treatment and was offended when Assad didn't honor his promises to Turkey. Instead of blaming itself for being too naive and trusting, Turkey accused Assad of being dishonest.

There is a good saying in Turkey: We are Muslims, we could be fooled but we are never fooling. But should it be applicable to state-to-state relations where a single mistake could lead to a war? Should not be diplomats, with all the intelligence at their disposal, be calculating pragmatists?

Ironically, Turkey even talked to Tehran to spot the missing journalists in Syria.  

In the heyday of conflict in Libya last year, Turkey secured the release of four The New York Times journalists, including late Anthony Shadid who told me he is very thankful for Turkey's help in his release. Another journalist Turkey could rescue from Libya was Guardian reporter Ghaith Abdul-Ahad. Abdul-Ahad told me Turkish government was more than helpful and directly involved in the process of his release. Turkey's help was also key in rescuing two German journalists and an American hiker jailed in Iran. It was all possible thanks to Turkey's ability to talk to everybody.

Many in Turkey have started raising serious doubts about Turkey's policies regarding Syria and Turkish diplomats are fiercely countering criticisms, labeling critics as "extensions of Baath regime" in Turkey.

When I inquire government proponents what the essential part of Turkey's Syria policy is, most of the answers include Turkey's shift of policy from standing by Assad to abandoning him. But is it really an effective policy in the case of Syrian regime who is turning a blind eye to sanctions leave alone the diplomatic isolation? This is a survivor regime for four decades that has gone through thick and thin of war, domestic rebellion and international pressure. Defying international community is what it is best at.

In the absence of alternative policies, the most effective way of handling Assad regime would be maintaining dialogue and urging him, no matter what, to stop violence and immediately implement reforms. Turkey is a country which was about to help Israel and Syria strike a historic deal regarding the Golan Heights. All of a sudden, these two countries are now Turkey's enemies. That was of course not Turkey's choice. But Turkey must understand that states may be morally correct in condemning domestic violence but it serves no purpose but severing ties and being unable to help tackle the issue. 

Talking to Syria was Turkey's single most effective and strong weapon and leverage. Turkey used it by throwing it away. 

At least we should be cheerful that the missing journalists are safe and healthy.

Peace in Syria goes through Assad not his departure

What should we do now? This is the most frequently asked question among diplomats who suck at diplomacy are dealing with a-year long violence in Syria that claimed lives of nearly 10,000 people. 

This is what a perfect conundrum looks like. Turkey, the most powerful state in the region critical of Syrian regime, unable to act except harboring Free Syrian Army leadership in southern Turkey, bordering with its former ally Syria. Arab states, worried over Iran’s rising influence in Syria and possible instability spilling over their countries, are uncertain whether or not to arm opposition fighters. The West, without any major stakes in Syria, understands the necessity to act to stop the violence in the country but doesn’t know how this could be realized. While Turkey, Arab nations and the West were counting Assad’s days of tenure last year, they have already abandoned the idea of post-Assad era anytime soon.

No need to blame Russia or China for blocking UN resolutions on Syria in the UN Security Council. Time will show that their malicious act in fact would benefit both Syria and its neighbors.

The chief culprit in this deadlock are states who misread the situation on the ground, underestimated Assad’s power and gave false hopes to the embattled Syrian opposition.

It was clear from the beginning that Assad will wield its army, one of the most powerful one in the region, to crush the uprising. Defeating Syrian army is virtually impossible no matter how well-armed Syrian rebels are and it could only be possible either through foreign military intervention or mass defections from the army. Defections happen when prospective defecting soldiers believe that they will be harbored and supported. But what they faced was undelivered promises and Syria’s killing machine that was turning more merciless every day.

States then claimed Assad’s days are numbered, building on a hope that defections will continue and he will resign under the heat of growing pressure. They definitely could not recall neighboring Iraq’s experience with Saddam. No neighbor, including Iran, gave hand to Saddam’s Iraq and he was defiant until his death. Why would not this be the case in Syria when there are countries ready to help it survive such as Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Russia?

Turkey was the most important actor that could help Syria handle the situation but failed to do so. Turkey blames Assad for not living up to his promises of withdrawing troops from cities. But Assad and Turkey never agreed that he will withdraw troops and end violence. He told Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who spent 6 hours with him on Aug. 9 last year, that he will end military operations once the security in cities are restored. Davutoğlu balked at this idea and said reforms and maintaining security must go hand in hand. Turkey then realized that Assad’s killing machine continued despite 6-hour marathon talks and Turkish leaders were felt betrayed. Turkey behaved prematurely in swiftly abandoning Assad and lost its most important leverage.

Another unfair accusation was when Turkey and Western nations accused Assad of being slow in reforms. But this was not the issue; the discussion should have centered on how to deal with the situation while the killings continue on both sides. Turkey is unable to change its coup-era constitution for almost 30 years and it could only this week bring coup leaders before court. Reforms take time and in the face of violence across the country, it is naivete to expect them to yield any tangible results. And let’s be honest, Assad made many reforms.

Instead of tantalizing armed opposition against Assad, Turkey and world powers could have drafted a road map for Syria and ensure Assad that they will help Syria in its peaceful transition to democracy. By encouraging Syria’s armed opposition, world made a strategic error and basically sent a lamb to fight against a wolf while it repeatedly said it won't intervene. 

But what to do now?

Syria is now under Iran’s influence. This is not because it is an evil regime but because only Iran is backing the Assad regime. Staying engaged with Assad throughout the entire process could have made Syria more cooperative and put it out of Iran’s orbit.

There is still an ample opportunity today to stop violence and push Assad to make sweeping reforms, implement them immediately with real, tangible steps and avoid raging fighting across the country that sits atop sectarian fault lines. UN-Arab League envoy Kofi Annan’s plan is promising. If Syria lives up to its promise to cease fighting by April 12, states must rush to Syria’s help in securing peaceful transition to a different political era that will benefit both Syrian authorities and the opposition.

Military intervention should be shelved permanently. Intervening into a country to stop possible civil war is damaging more. War’s death toll is usually more than most of civil wars. Diplomacy is the only viable path to peace in Syria -- and it doesn't include arming rebels or encouraging them to display "brave fighting for dignity." If peace is ever possible in Syria, it will be through talking to Assad not demanding his departure.

Turkey is again America's buddy, but why?

Turkey has won many accolades from the West for a renewed alliance with the U.S. and for playing a key partnership role with its friends in NATO in handling complex situation surrounding the Middle East as unrest rocked the region more than a year ago. 

Some pegged this turnabout to Turkey’s what they claim “failed foreign policy of zero problems.” Soner Çağaptay, in his op-ed in The Los Angeles Times, attempted to explain why Turkey has decided to rebuild its what he said more beneficial alliance with the West.

He noted that far from confronting Washington on a range of issues, Ankara is embracing its membership in NATO while working closely with Washington on Middle East issues, including Iran and coordinating Syria policy.

He asserted that Ankara's slowly drifting away from the West since early 2000s almost upset Turkey's “unique identity” that resulted in a period of increasingly cold relations with the U.S. and embraced the Middle East in a bid to become a regional power.

“This strategy, however, did not exactly make Ankara a formidable power in the Middle East,” Çağaptay claimed in his article.

According to Çağaptay, Turkey came to realize that its strategic value to the Middle East is not rooted in the fact it's a Muslim power but that it is a Muslim power with strong ties to the US and the ability to sit at the table with the Europeans.

Çağaptay is wrong. Turkey’s increasingly good relations with the U.S. is not about Turkey’s “realization” that it is has more strategic value if it has strong ties with the U.S. and NATO. Turkey’s renewed alliance with the U.S. could be explained by its “threat perception.” U.S. partnership benefit Turkey in countering Iran's ambitions in Iraq and Lebanon, in getting rid of Assad and containing French expansion in the Middle East. This was not the case in 2010 and might not be in 2013.  

Moreover, Turkey’s return to the Western world only means good relations with the U.S. Turkey’s European Union membership bid is stalled, its ties with NATO ally France are on hold and it is dissatisfied over European role in the Arab Spring.

Turkey had secured lucrative businesses in Libya, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iran and Gulf countries by having good and sometimes personal relations with Arab and Iranian rulers. Escalating tensions with Israel made it popular among Arab public. U.S. policies were then detrimental to Turkey’s interests in the region. It bluntly supported Israel, asked Turkey to cut its business with Iran and sever ties with Hezbollah and Hamas. This was in contrary to Turkey’s business interests and its argument that it has ability to talk to every actor in the region.

U.S. also asked Turkey to install a component of NATO missile defense system and publicly declare that it is aimed at Iran. Obama was planning to deflect Russia's attention from the radar system by mentioning Iran in the hope to maintain his "reset" policy but this would cost Turkey's good relations with Iran.   

As Turkey’s business interests were in danger in Libya, Egypt and Syria due to the political instability that swept across the region last year, Turkey found the U.S. as a trustworthy partner that could help reduce Turkey’s damage. Inability of the U.S. to communicate with countries experiencing instability, cooperation with Turkey in these areas was beneficial. 

These were the circumstances that brought NATO allies together and these ties might be severed if Turkey again feels threatened by U.S. policies in the region.

Çağaptay talks about Turkey’s “act alone” strategy and asserts that the Arab Spring has exposed its limits. Turkey has never had such a strategy. In contrast, it wanted to maximize cooperation with neighboring countries by burying hostilities. If “acting alone” means shunning cooperation with Western powers and the U.S., it was necessary. Western engagement in the Middle East two years ago directly contradicted Turkey’s national and business interests; acting with them would be a misguided policy.

He also talks about new rivalry of Turkey with Iran because of the developments in neighboring Syria. Turkey’s adversary with Iran is not new. Turkey had good relations with Iran in the past few years because Israel and the U.S. squeezed the Islamic republic and this imperiled Turkey’s foreign policy interests.

Today, Iran’s growing influence in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon makes it necessary for Turkey to side with Washington to counter Iran’s ambitions. This is what balance of power in the region necessitates.

Deterrence is a lie! (if it is Iran)

Fareed Zakaria joins a chorus of intellectuals urging President Barack Obama to lay off “all options on the table” talk with respect to Iran as he smells a troubling trend driving up to a war similar to 2003  Iraq war campaign.

His column in The Washington Post aims to assure the conservative wing who has already started to beat the drums of war that deterrence usually works, even if it concerns Iran. He says when he was in college in the early 1980s, he invited Ronald Reagan’s defense secretary, Caspar Weinberger, to give a speech on campus. He recalls that U.S. colleges were hotbeds of opposition to the Reagan administration and a series of students stood up and started chanting a single line as he spoke: “Deterrence is a lie!”

These leftist groups were then opposed to Reagan administration’s policy of containment with the Soviet Union, unaware of the fact the president’s containment would lead to chaotic collapse of the Soviets in a couple of years.

Zakaria says it used to be those on the right who would patiently explain the practical virtues of deterrence in 1980s but today they reject this scenario regarding Iran.

He notes that conservative think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute and others denounce containment and deterrence and claim that it would lead us instead to a policy that culminates in a preventive war.

People on both sides understand the dangerous consequences of pointed strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities but they definitely consider these “collateral damages” less scary than Iran with nuclear bomb.

According to Zakaria, the prospect of destruction produces peace and its record is remarkable. History is a great guide: “Great powers went to war with brutal regularity for hundreds of years. Then came nuclear weapons, and there has not been a war between great powers since 1945 — the longest period of peace between great powers in history.”

But why deterrence cannot work in Iran’s case? It is simply because scaremongers regularly attempt to portray Iranian leadership as morally corrupt, irrational and suicidal. But history again suggests otherwise. Iran has never fought a war with any Western powers. Its insurgency against Russian and British occupation in first and second world wars was minimal. There is hardly any piece of news in the Western media speaking about “Iranian suicide bomber” or “Iranian terrorist” in the past few decades.

A recent survey by Reuters/Ipsos showed that 56 percent of Americans would support U.S. military action against Iran and 39 percent of Americans opposed military strikes if there were evidence that Iran is building a nuclear bomb. 53 percent of Americans say they would back U.S. military action if it led to higher gasoline prices, while 42 percent said they would not.   

Iranian regime is a successful survivor in an increasingly hostile neighborhood of self-help. It faces little domestic opposition that could affect its foreign policy decision-making in an irrational way and it clearly understands its red lines. An attempt to frame Iranian regime and its rulers as “irrational” is not helpful and even counterproductive. Soviets’ Stalin and North Korea’s late dictator were way more brutal and merciless than the current Iranian leadership. But they could be easily and successfully deterred -- without any war talk.

Constant portrayal of Iran's leadership as irrational helps conservative narrative that nuclear weapons are dangerous toys at the hands of Iranian rulers. And that’s the main reason why Americans believe that Iran with nuclear weapons must be stopped – even if it significantly hurts their daily lives.

Who is stronger: Azerbaijan or Turkey?

Cengiz Aktar, who is known for his pro-Armenian stance among Turkish public, tried to handle a sensitive issue in his column on Wednesday, which is rarely discussed.

He basically claims that the Turkish influence in the Arab world has no match in the Caucasus. Quite to the contrary, he then goes, it is now Azerbaijan, which is asserting its influence over Turkey. He is providing a famous example from Turkey’s unfinished business of normalization with Armenia that has become a failed attempt in 2009 after both Turkey and Armenia proposed a set of preconditions to implement the twin protocols on establishing diplomatic ties.

Azerbaijan opposed the normalization, which included opening of borders between Armenia and Turkey two months after the protocols are ratified by parliaments. Azerbaijan explicitly said it is contrary to its national interests.

Aktar also suggests Turkey’s oil and gas interests with Azerbaijan as a reason why Turkey hesitated going down the road of burying a century old hostilities with its arch foe. According to Aktar, one of the reasons why Turkey decided to end normalization process with Armenia is Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. He implied that siding with Azerbaijan in the conflict is basically "blindness" stemming from Turkey's overconfidence.

The Turkish columnist says thanks to Turkey’s recent relative economic and diplomatic success, it now appears more and more to be an over-confident country. “The reason behind the inability to develop policies is the blindness triggered by that overconfidence,” he claims.

Aktar is correct in suggesting that Turkey's energy interests, internal opposition, discontent from Azerbaijan and its luxury to consume its increasing power killed its Armenia initiative.

He is right on the spot when he says Turkey’s overconfidence has derailed some of its policies, made it a sponsor of unnecessary policies that in fact brought little benefit, if any.

What Aktar was offering as an explanation of such a change is true for many cases including this one. But he is erring when he claims that the outcome of such a policy shift runs contrary to Turkey's national interests. Turkey changed its Armenia policies not by carefully calculating its benefits and by realizing that Azerbaijan is a strategic asset; however, the outcome is in the best interest of Turkey. Setting aside all domestic pressure and emotional attachment to Azerbaijan, a carefully calculated pragmatic assessment would yield the same result -- something Aktar ignores to see.

If Armenia was awash with oil and gas and Azerbaijan was a burden, Turkey would act the same way because of internal opposition and Azerbaijan's dissatisfaction. Aktar’s argument would be correct in this scenario.

When states have too much power, they also have luxury to use this clout in adventurous ways and are easily influenced by domestic lobbying and politics. Kenneth Waltz aptly says “international politics is too serious a business” and he would be right if states had just enough power to defend themselves. Too much power is being abused, mostly by domestic political actors.

What Aktar is suggesting is true in many ways. Over-confidence and too much power is being abused and frequently corrupts. But Aktar should sit tight; Turkey was lucky that domestic political demands were in line with its national interests with respect to maintaining good ties with Azerbaijan.

Obama’s Iran doctrine misguided, increases likelihood of war

U.S. President Barack Obama has made it clear in the past few days that he will not countenance nuclear-armed Iran, a clear-cut red line – if not bluff. This also, in other words, means the U.S. is not even considering plans of containment after Iran gets a nuclear bomb.

There are many reasons why Obama’s premature Iran red line announcement is misguided at best. Let’s consider two scenarios with respect to the Iran’s nuclear imbroglio.

In the first case, also current US-Israeli policy, the U.S. and Israel declare that they will not tolerate Iran with nuclear arsenals. With this policy, war of devastating consequences is inevitable if Iran decides to go down the nuclear road. Even if Iran does not develop nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future, which it claims it doesn’t, preventive war is seen in the offing as trust deficit between Iran and the West is unlikely to be eliminated. In a nutshell, after the U.S. and Israel choose bite over bark, the war is either inevitable or highly likely. The astonishing part of this scenario is that it doesn’t solve Iran’s nuclear crisis; it might instead urge Iranian leadership to redouble their efforts to develop a nuclear weapon and even spur other countries to follow the suit to counter Iran.

Fortunately, Obama clearly understands that this rhetoric carries the seeds of war. In a related development, he said on Tuesday that diplomacy can still resolve the crisis over Iran's possible pursuit of nuclear weapons and accused his Republican rivals of "beating the drums of war."

In the second scenario, the U.S. and Israel avoid putting red lines and instead increase the intensity of international pressure to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear bomb. With this policy, no matter what Iran does, the West shelves war with Iran and hence avoids destabilizing Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Palestinian territories along with skyrocketing the price of oil amid global economic recession.

Containment is not new to the U.S. foreign policy; it has successfully contained major nuclear powers such as Soviets and China in the past, whose leaders were much more brutal and merciless. Containment of Iran will also make Iran decelerate its nuclear program and make compromises to rescue its crippling economy. If Iran still works tooth and nail to acquire a nuclear weapon, in the absence of U.S. or Israeli pressure, regional countries such as Turkey or other Gulf nations will counter Iran’s ambitions. They will eventually shoulder the burden of containing Iran. The lack of alacrity in regional countries to squeeze Iran into abandoning its suspected nuclear program is because the U.S. and Israel are doing much of the work.

After the Islamic republic gets the bomb, there are prospects that Iran and Israel may again become regional friends in the face of common Arab threat. Much of the Iran-Israeli standoff has to do with Iran’s nuclear ambitions; accepting to live with nuclear-armed Iran will clear the way for a possible Iran-Israel thaw. If history is any guide, it will be clear that war with Iran is more perilous than Iran getting a nuclear bomb. 

Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer and Robert Jervis have all made it clear that more nuclear weapons are key for stability and enhanced security. This is not to suggest that Iran should acquire a nuclear bomb but to advocate that US and Israeli leaders must lay off hawkish talk and concentrate more on containment – a better strategy to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear bomb than war that could unleash unpredictable devastating consequences.

If Obama's "zero tolerance" policy is a bluff -- and he made it clear that it is not -- it will reduce U.S. credibility all around the world in case the U.S. doesn't take decisive actions once Iran declares it has nuclear weapons.