Calling 'bad boy' to do good deed

Different foreign policy wonks have been tossing back and forth the question of whether to ask Iran to use its tremendous leverage in Syria to find a political solution to the 16-month crisis there that has now left more than 20,000 Syrians dead.

Vali Nasr, former assistant to late diplomat Richard Holbrooke, has an op-ed in the New York Times, where he claims that the Western and Arab strategy to focus on toppling Syria's embattled President Bashar al-Assad takes that country down the slippery slope. In his view, Iran is the most significant actor in this game, which major powers ignore. Given the fact that any indulgence granted to demands of Iran has reapead a horrible harvest in the past few years, it is legitimate to ask why Tehran could possibly play a constructive role in the Syrian crisis. The article is fascinating because hardly anything claimed in the piece is theoretically wrong.

Iran is an unreliable and unpredictable country -- it takes extra caution and patience to work with this country. History shows that it would be a mistake to bet on Iran's words and pledges. Working with Iran in difficult cases such as Syria is a sure path to a room full of trouble. For years, the Western countries have worked tooth and nail to move Syria out of Iran's orbit and accused the Islamic republic of aligning with Syria in a bid to extend its influence to the eastern Mediterranean. How could now Western nations ask Iran to play a constructive role in Syria when it believes that Iran should have no business in the country? In addition, Iran blatantly backed Assad and gave no sign that it would agree to a Sunni-dominated government once the Syrian president steps down.

In Nasr's article, few of these concerns are mentioned or addressed adequately. Nasr claims that with or without Assad as its leader, Syria now has all the makings of a grim and drawn-out civil war. He argues that the United States and its allies must enlist the cooperation of Assad’s allies — Russia and, especially, Iran  — to find a power-sharing arrangement for a post-Assad Syria that all sides can support, however difficult that may be to achieve. In his view, involving Iran in any resolution to the conflict could throw Tehran a lifeline, but repercussions of prolonged conflict in Syria would have devastating consequences for both Syria and its vicinity. He then goes on in length to explain how powerful Assad's "killing machine" is and how it carries the risk of becoming another Lebanon. Nasr contends that the West has already bungled its attempt to topple Assad and he says the Western strategy of supporting opposition to oust the Syrian president is a wrong goal.

To find a way out of this impasse, Nasr offers a transition plan that includes most importantly Iran and Turkey, which he says has a military muscle to influence the conflict. According to Nasr, Iran will join in the bargain because it is not sure what will follow Assad if he exits.

Syria is a battleground between Sunni majority, backed by US allies such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and Alawite minority, supported by Hezbollah and Iran rather than a fight for democracy. Why would Turkey or Iran agree to such a transition plan when each side believes that it is winning the war? Iran seems unwavering in its support and its foreign minister said this week that such a plan is nothing but "an illusion." Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan already said twice last week that rebels in Syria are putting final touches to the revolution.

Theoretically, Nasr is correct. Underlying this strategy is the view that a country, especially one which could use its political weight to shift troubling trend in another country, will most likely agree to a midway formula with which everyone would win.
But realities on the ground make it impossible to work with Iran for a peaceful solution in Syria due to regional bickering and too much antagonism between the U.S. and Iran. Besides, it is hard to imagine that Syrian rebels will agree to any role Iran would play in Syria's transitional government.

Nasr's article would make more sense if he wrote this last summer and replaced words "Iran" with "Turkey," which had enormous influence on both Syrian opposition and the Assad regime but abandoned it for reasons still can't make me sleep well.

Russian warships in eastern Med no longer threat

Russia is amassing unprecedented naval force into eastern Mediterranean but there is little indication that its possible naval supremacy in the region will remain long as Turkish and U.S. warships are seeking for counterbalance.

Russia’s navy chief Vice Admiral Viktor Chirkov told reporters on Thursday that there are ten Russian warships in the eastern Mediterranean dispatched solely for war games and that their presence in the area is not related to the Syrian crisis.

Russia earlier said it will not allow Libya-style military intervention in Syria, which largely was carried by the extensive help of warships and aircraft carriers of NATO-member states in the Mediterranean.

Fleet of the Russian battleships off Syrian coast is one of the largest in the past few decades and definitely poses a danger to the security of Turkey, NATO’s only Muslim member. But there is little concern for a major power face-off in the region as American warships are expected to arrive in the eastern Mediterranean months earlier than previously expected amid escalating tensions in the region.

Currently, USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier is docked off the Turkey’s Mediterranean city of Antalya. Turkish, French and British warships also separately conducted military drills in the area. There is little evidence that Russian naval forces in eastern Mediterranean will be Turkey's headache due to growing American and Turkish naval power in the region. But the fragile situation there, no doubt, makes it almost impossible for Western powers, including NATO, to conduct a possible successful military operation against Syria in the near future.

I wrote about this and other developments in the eastern Mediterranean here.

Assad wants to leave but rebels make it harder

A news report that Assad is ready to step down in an orderly way received mixed reactions on Friday, most of which mocked the Syrian president for demanding a civilized transition after ordering his army to kill too many civilians in the course of the uprising.

News agencies quoted on Friday Russia’s Paris ambassador as saying in an interview that Assad is ready to step down in an orderly way but most Syrian activists were quick to reject the ambassador’s possible scenario they thought could be Russia’s plan.

In fact, it was agreed at a conclave of foreign ministers in Geneva late last month that a transitional government must be formed in Syria by a mutual consent. Assad implicitly endorsed the plan as he slowly be starting sense his own defeat and it is out of the question that he considers himself staying in the transitional government. Syrian opposition categorically rejects any plan that makes Assad a part of the transitional government and his stay is impossible if mutual consent were given.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan told reporters on Wednesday that Geneva plan in fact agreed a transitional government that doesn’t grant a position for Assad. He said even Russians seem positive to a transitional government without Assad.

In a nutshell, it is not news that Assad wants to leave and a transitional government is a good way for Assad to step down in an “orderly way.”

But surge in attacks by opposition fighters and the infamous Damascus bombing this week that killed four senior security figures within Assad’s inner circle could have considerably changed the scale. Fearing that the opposition won’t stick to its promise, Assad has indeed declared an all-out war against rebels and sees his family’s survival in purging the entire armed opposition.

At this stage, a possible ceasefire could peacefully make Assad leave the power but increasingly growing assaults on regime officials, police and security checkpoints make it almost impossible for Assad to consider a transitional plan that will safely put him out of the power.

Egypt’s Morsi is not good news for Turkey

Very few understand how Turkey is rather a foe for Egypt than this man protesting outside the residence where Davutoglu and Morsi holding talks.

Turkey was excited to see a conservative president with beard in Cairo who shares similar views on domestic politics with Turkey’s previously progressive and reform-minded ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party). But Ankara's fervor won’t last long.

In a sign of this excitement, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu told reporters in Cairo following his talks with Egypt's new leader Mohammad Morsi earlier this week that Egypt needs to be strong in the region and that strong Egypt means Turkey will be strong. "Strong Egypt means stability in the region,” Turkish foreign minister added.

There is little, if any, evidence to believe what Davutoglu says is reasonable. Points Turkish foreign minister stressed in his remarks are unprecedented in history and not possible in a normal setting of international politics. Two increasingly strong states in the same region are usually a primary cause of instability. Two powerful states hardly coexist unless there is a significantly strong state outside the region that is threat to both of these countries.

If history is any guide, peaceful relations between Egypt and Turkey are very unlikely in the long term. A short glance over history will prove this point further. European powers would most likely not fight each other in two devastating world wars if there was a powerful threat from Asia. European powers could establish a relatively stable union only after Communist threat from the East put the fate of entire continent on danger.

In another notable development, Turkey moved to militarily intervene in Cyprus in 1974, fighting a bloody war with Greeks there after a Greek-inspired coup. The U.S. then put tremendous pressure on Turkey to rule out the intervention and urged Greece to remain restraint. Greece’s response was minimal because both states faced a bigger threat in the north in the heydays of the communism: The Soviet Union.

The same scenario can describe the alliance among wealthy Gulf Arabs too. Saddam’s Iraq was a significant threat to the region and today Iran seems interested in instigating instability in the oil and gas rich region. Gulf Arabs will likely remain in union in a foreseeable future unless Iran chooses to cease its confrontational policy with the Arabs.

History is also awash with Turkish-Egyptian confrontation despite the fact that Cairo was under Ottoman rule. Egypt has always been a difficult country for Turkey to deal with during the Ottoman rule. It was the most disobeying vassal state compared to other regions for Istanbul. During 1831-1841, Egypt’s ruler Muhammad Ali challenged and fought against Ottomans to an extent that European powers had to intervene in 1840 with London Convention to prevent a new empire dominating the region vital for Europe’s trade with the South Asia. The incident is known as Oriental Crisis of 1840. Muhammad Ali virtually established a new empire encompassing Egypt, Sudan and Syria up to today’s southern Turkish city of Adana. Only after a solid military action in the eastern Mediterranean by Western empires Muhammad Ali’s new empire was put on hold from moving ahead. 

Today, Turkey and Egypt don’t face an important outside power that could threaten security and survival of both states. Instead of cooperation, the two countries have a lot of reasons to fight about. They share increasingly unstable and militarized eastern Mediterranean. New oil and gas finds in the eastern Mediterranean is also a good reason to seek dominance in the region.

Leadership in the wider Muslim world is another reason why Turkey and Egypt will most likely be foe more than a friend. Unlike its new leader, Egypt’s ousted leader Hosni Mubarak was decrepit and pro-Western. Morsi is only slightly different from leaders Libya, Tunisia and Morocco elected in the past year and we are yet to see a conservative leader in Syria largely representing views of the Muslim Brotherhood. It will be much easier and more effective for an Arab leader to appeal to the Muslim world rather than a Turkish-speaking leader.

In a nutshell, a stronger Egypt means more headaches for Turkey.

Should we care about Egypt's ruler?

As students of international relations, should we really care about Egypt's new president? Not that much. Because hardly a change in domestic politics of a country shifts its foreign policy orientation. If we are to observe a slight change in foreign policy of Egypt, it is not because it has a new president but because powerful waves of dynamic changes in international politics had pushed Egypt to elect a new president that will be competent in dealing with challenges of the current period. This argument is made not to downplay the power of people that shook Egypt last year but to emphasize what made them to flock into streets.

1979 revolution in Iran is an oft-cited example by those who claim that changes in domestic politics directly affect foreign policy. Then pro-Western Iran made a U-turn in 1979 in foreign policy after Islamists grabbed power in Tehran. But a short glance over events in the region reveals that in fact Iran’s stark departure from its previous position in the region is not because it had an Islamist leader. While Iran was Israel’s and U.S. ally, Egypt and Syria had cool relations with the U.S. and were at war with Israel. It made sense for Iran to side with Israel and the U.S. as long as Arabs were in the other camp. But when Egypt abandoned Syria and changed its orientation with Camp David Accords in 1978, Iran also switched its side and stood by Syria. This change was facilitated by the advent of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979.

Assassination of Anwar Sadat after the Egyptian president’s disengagement with Israel is also a good example of how international politics directly affects domestic politics. But assassination of Sadat was not a smart move because his successor had made life hell for the Muslim Brotherhood for 30 years.

Leaders add personal flavor to foreign policy only in cases when they have a luxury to do so. Egypt will be unable to translate its already weak economy into military buildup and the army will continue to have a powerful say in the country’s foreign policy. For the U.S., stability in Egypt is important because Suez Canal is a strategic point where over 2 million barrels of mostly Gulf oil are transported to Western markets every day. This is almost equal to Saudi's Arabia's daily oil output. For this reason, the U.S. will stand by any Egyptian president as long as the president does not seek adventures in the Suez.

More than 17,000 ships pass through the Suez Canal every year, of which 25 percent is oil and gas. When Egypt recovers from the revolution and becomes stronger than it needs, we can then talk about how domestic politics affects its foreign policy decisions. Too much power always carries the risk of abuse. As long as Egypt is weak, new president will have little discretion to drive his country's foreign policy to a direction he wants.

 

Power struggle in Egypt

Putting foreign policy aside, it is also fun to see an Egyptian president with beard. Egyptians deserve plaudits for their brave struggle in the past year to elevate their country from a league of authoritarian nations to a place it deserves.

Egypt is a troubled country with very powerful military playing as a subject in politics. It will be no easy task to sideline the army despite president-elect Mohamed Morsi’s defiance in Tahrir on Friday. It is odd to observe that Turkey is both an inspiration for masses longing for democracy and for generals trying to establish their tutelage in the political system. Turkey is a NATO member country and has commitments to limit the role of military in politics as part of its membership talks with the European Union. It has a coup-era constitution that was drafted by junta after 1980 military coup and despite 10-year tenure of partly progressive ruling AK Party, the constitution seems firmly in place.

In 2003, shortly after the conservative AK Party came to power, Turkish military issued a strongly-worded statement that was considered as a blunt interference into democracy. Even in 2007, shortly before AK Party’s second term, military issued a statement on its web-site Turks call a “post-modern coup.” Democratization has taken a quite long time to take hold in Turkey.

But what makes me upbeat about Egypt is how fast developments take place there. What happened in Egypt in the past year would take 20 Turkey-years in Ankara. No doubt it will be extremely painful to watch power struggle between civilian politicians and the military but it makes me optimistic to anticipate that it will take not as long as it took Turkey to consolidate its democracy today. It took 66 years for Turkey to partly consolidate its democracy by limiting very powerful military establishment. I’m sure it will be faster in Egypt.

Turkey's new Syria policy means de facto buffer zone

This video shows a long convoy of Turkish military vehicles being transported to Turkish-Syrian border via Mardin. 

As if waiting for that moment, some activists had hard time in hiding their joy when Syria shot down Turkish warplane, believing that this now makes a good case for taking some tangible steps in averting 16-month long crisis in Turkey's southern neighbor.

I have bad news for warmongers: I know no single case of plane shootdown since the WWII that sparked a full-fledged armed conflict. Turkey has no major interest in attacking Syria, including a security one.

Turkey has long worked tooth and nail to make its Syria policy relevant and emphasis has been repeatedly put on Syria being Turkey's neighboring country. But this alone does not make this country more important than other countries which are not Turkey's neighbors.

Now there is an ample opportunity for Turkey to portray Syria as a country ruled by a regime that is too much frustrated and desparately attacking neighboring countries with no reason.

I'm an anti-interventionist yet I'm a staunch supporter of heightened security in Turkish-Syrian border. It was Turkey's mistake to let Turkish-Syrian border loose and fragile to an attack from Syria. When Syria was deploying tanks and armored vehicles in Aleppo, only dozens of miles away from Turkey, Ankara should have demanded an explanation from Damascus and requested it to withdraw the troops.

Syria shot down Turkish fighter jet on Friday and Erdoğan ordered the army to stay alert and changed the rules of engagement of the military on Tuesday. The Turkish army is now ordered to shoot anything they deem threatening from the Syrian side.

This means Syrian troops and tanks won't be able to conduct hot pursuit of rebels, conduct military operations near the Turkish border and pound bombs on rebel camps by choppers or warplanes.

This, in turn, will increase defections and make the Turkish border safe haven for the rebels.

Is Syria that stupid to shoot down Turkey's plane?

Early on Saturday, a statement released after a security summit headed by Turkey's prime minister said Syria shot down Turkey's fighter jet, without elaborating how and why.

Many had speculated that although Syria acted ruthless, Turkey also deserves blame in this incident.

Early on Sunday, however, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu made it clear that Syrian side knew it was a Turkish plane, the jet was hit in international air space without any warning, the act was hostile and Turkey will not remain silent. Turkey has not yet unveiled its retaliatory steps and the most you can say is that there are scattered signs that things are getting worse more slowly.

Syria's downing of Turkish warplane is not unmatched in history. There have been many similar incidents like this before. But few exemplify irrationality of these kind of attacks better than Friday's incident, which also probably killed two Turkish pilots.

Then the question comes, why did Syria shoot down Turkey's jet?

Syrian regime critics would jump to a conclusion that the attack is a manifestation of Assad's growing frustration and spillover of the domestic crisis into neighbors. This argument rests heavily on the view that Assad is a ruthless killer and he would not hesitate shooting down planes of neighboring countries.

They claim that this incident appears to be rather a remarkable example of how Assad has become a threat to the stability not only within his country but also to countries in Syria's vicinity. One could make a broader argument that it is not surprising to see Assad attacking every perceived threat after all these atrocities his army has been committing.

One of the misconceptions that muddle the debate over the shooting incident is that rulers like Assad have spinned out of control to a degree that would attack neighboring countries.

But those critics miss two fundamental truths about the situation on the ground.

In two cases states make similar, irrational military provacations like this one that is obviously not in the aggressive state's national interest.

First, states are deliberately behaving in an irrational way to signal to adversaries that it is hell-bent and ruthless in retaliation. This strategy conveys messages as if the state does not have a capacity to understand warnings and red lines.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's earlier remarks that Israel should cease to exist is an evident example of how states sometimes behave as an irrational actor to avoid military attacks.

North Korea's recent military provacations such as sinking a South Korean ship or shelling its island two years ago is a case in point. This kind of tactics are reliable with nuclear-armed states such as North Korea. Why to mess up with nuclear-armed North Korea whose leader is describing itself suicidal and irrational? The same goes with Tehran, whose leader is speaking about destroying Israel and possessing dozens of long-range missiles that could significantly damage Israeli cities. These leaders are definitely not irrational but it is benefiting to be seen this way.

This strategy seems unapplicable in Syria because it has relatively weak and increasingly divided military power, is running out of cash and exhausted by a year and half long operations against rebels across the country. It has little if any capability to do harm to countries considering intervening militarily to end the 15-month long crisis there.

Another case when states behave irrational in foreign policy is when domestic actors push decision-making process to a direction that is not in their national interests. This could be because of divided governance like in Iran or supporting overseas brethren no matter how damaging that policy could be.

Stephen M. Walt and John Mearsheimer's 2007 book on the Israeli lobby is a good read how domestic actors could derail country's foreign policy agenda.

It’s worth bearing in mind that there have been numerous claims that military commanders in Syria have often been acting beyond the administration’s control. In the shadow of potential war and violence, those surrounding Assad are not necessarily making a single, consultative decision based on country's national interests. Given the varying constraints on the power of Assad and the administration across the state bureaucracies, it is not surprising that senior army commanders and bureaucrats are pushing for policies that are not really made by the president and his close circles loyal to him. Recent leaked e-mails of Assad family depict how weak institutions the Syrian regime has.

The crisis in Syria has steered this process reasonably well and generated enormous conflict within the regime.

Syria's Foreign Ministry spokesman was overly apologetic and friendly in his Monday briefing, saying that Turks and Syrians are brothers and that Syria is not hostile to its northern neighbor. Why would a state shoot down a foreign jet in international air space and send messages of friendship afterwards?