Turkey’s leadership not fading but emerging

It is now famous hobby among observers to document what they say “demise of Turkey’s zero problems foreign policy” in a “I told ya” style. They are largely claiming that Turkey’s foreign policy of zero problems – a disguise to claim a responsible regional leader – is falling apart in the face of uncertainty that encircled Turkey’s foreign policy decision-makers as they are confused over an appropriate way of responding to recent developments in the Middle East.

Observers largely ignored the fact that it is not Turkish foreign policy that is peeling but an ideology that has naively driven the country into an utopian land of friendships that yielded no benefits. Demise of ailing foreign policy for a rising regional power means the country is now more exposed to conduct a successful foreign policy that marries with realities on the ground. Eloquent speeches Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu was delivering over the past few years where the gap between rhetoric and action widened only consumed Turkey’s credibility on the world stage.

Turkey’s ambitious foreign policy, undoubtedly, seemed out of touch with realities on the ground and the country’s zero problems doctrine took it down a slippery slope once the challenges have become inevitable. Underlying this strategy was the view that a borderless Middle East, one in which Turkey arrogates to itself the regional role of setting standards, would allow people freely trade with each other and contribute to the prosperity of each nations. A win-win.

This grand strategy – designed only for peaceful times -- has been pursued through an array of liberal initiatives in which Turkey started to reap its economic fruits. If history is any guide, it will be evidently clear that there is no a quarter decade in the history of the Middle East when wars and conflicts did not prevail every kind of economic or social transactions.

And then a furious wave of unrest blew in like a fatal wind. Navigating in a region of fragile balance of power and vulnerable dictators is challenging and that is why, to borrow Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s phrase, there is “no mercy for the weak” and let me add – for the naive. Turkey’s leadership had later learned that maintaining good ties with Arab rulers is a sure path to a room full of trouble. Its decision-makers are still tossing back and forth the question of whether to pursue principled foreign policy at the expense of Turkey’s interests.

Steven A. Cook penned a piece in The Atlantic – surely better than anyone else who has written on this subject lately – claiming that Turkey’s dream of regional leadership has failed. Cook is correct is pointing to the fact that things are not developing in the way Davutoğlu envisioned but this is good news rather than a cause of concern for Turkey’s Kissinger.

Turkey has learned an important lesson from its interaction with leaders like late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad: No one can be trusted.

The future now hinges on Turkey’s ability to reinvent its foreign policy strategy. Turkey’s prime minister and foreign minister drafted Turkey’s strategy in dealing with the unrest sweeping in Libya and Syria based on their trust and expectation that these leaders will heed Turkey’s recommendation. That did not happen.

Current crises and cracks in Turkey’s foreign policy strategy will surely heal its already bleeding foreign policy rather than damaging it. Turkey’s leadership is thus not fading in the region yet its rise will now be more conspicuous than ever.

Turkey deserves no blame for working with dictators

In his recent article published by Project Syndicate, Sinan Ülgen argues that Turkey’s now failed “zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy lifted Turkey among “league of influential nations” but the Arab Spring exposed the policy’s vulnerabilities, and Turkey must now seek a new guiding principle for regional engagement.

He is correct in suggesting that Turkey’s zero problems foreign policy strategy has become unsustainable but he is wrong in claiming that the policy failed because dictators have started to tumble.

He asserts that Turkey cultivated unconditional relations with authoritarian rulers in the Middle East and when the Arab Spring put these despotic regimes in danger, Turkey was forced to pick sides and forsake its previous policy of maintaining good ties with autocratic regimes.

Turkey experts Mustafa Akyol, Soner Çağaptay, Gönül Tol also argued here, here and here that zero problems foreign policy failed because of the Arab Spring. They basically claim that zero problems foreign policy meant zero troubles with dictators.

The argument seems simple and appropriate at initial glance. But is there any state that puts democracy or human rights record as a precondition in building ties with another state? Those states who highlight and criticize lack of democracy in a country do so to make their already strained or bad relations more legitimate and seem to having foreign policy based on moral principles. How does Turkey deserve blame for improving its ties with neighboring countries? This should not be the source of guilt.

It is not Turkey’s fault to have good ties with authoritarian regimes, it is what nations do. Above all, who decides what is a “good government?” Every ruling structure has its own distinct fallacies and shortcomings.

It was, however, Turkey’s fault to build its foreign policy based on personal relationships, principles and naive assumptions that states can be trusted. Turkey worsened its relations with countries like Libya or Syria not because of brutal crackdown on protesters by Gaddafi and Assad regime. Turkey’s leadership decided to cut ties with these countries only after its foreign and prime ministers felt betrayed and insulted.

Turkey vociferously rejected the idea of military intervention in Libya and even opposed sanctions at the outset but it later dramatically changed its position only after realizing that Gaddafi shrugged off Turkey’s recommendations and not because he became a monster.

Turkey did not severed its ties with Damascus until August, when Assad forces had already killed more than 2,000, and Erdoğan dumped Assad as a friend only after he felt betrayed, lied and not because he became "evil mass killer." It was easier for Turkey to call on former Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak to step down because Turkish-Egyptian relations were driven by national interests not mutual trust.

A closer look at the nature and dynamics of authoritarian regimes, it is obvious to note that fallen dictators remained in power for decades. Alternative to Turkey’s close ties with dictators would be its previous foreign policy of isolationism that brought no benefit and it is unfair to accuse Turkey of cultivating relations with dictators and see it as a chief culprit in bringing down the zero problems foreign policy.