Desparate world powers, in an attempt to behead the Syrian regime, tried many ways they considered effective in nudging Syrian president Bashar al-Assad into quitting. All of them failed miserably.
Diplomatic overtures to end the bloodshed in Syria could be regarded as one of the most laborious, multi-lateral and the longest diplomatic talks to halt a civil war in the history. Initially, the European Union, particularly the U.S., held direct consultations with the Assad regime earlier last year, with U.S. Congressman Dennis Kucinich visiting Damascus to urge Assad to unclench his fist while responding to mass protests across the nation. Then the duty fell on the shoulders of regional countries, mainly Turkey. While intense negotiations were under way, Ankara was angered by Assad’s what it said “blatant lies” and hence dumped the Syrian president. The Arab League took the flag but gave it up by February this year after failing to achieve any tangible progress. Then joined the United Nations, appointing its former chief Kofi Annan. That initiative, too, ended in failure.
In the course of the failing Syrian diplomacy, when the U.S., Arab nations and Turkey refused to hold dialogue with Assad, they then turned to states who threw weight behind the Assad regime and considered them effective actors with tremendous leverage in Syria. Neither of them had success in ending the 20-month violence in Syria.
Today’s fashion is to pin hopes on Moscow. Many states, particularly Turkey, fixed their gaze on Russia, saying that, in the words of Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Russia holds the key to the Syrian crisis. Ankara reiterated its position on Russia’s role earlier this week, asserting that it is Russia, not Iran, what mattered most when it comes to Syria.
One reason why Turkey is too hopeful that Russia’s involvement could change things on the ground is because Russia veteod several UN Security Council resolutions it deemed biased against the Assad regime. It was partly because Russia felt fooled by the Security Council members when they endorsed a resolution last year that eventually swept Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi out of power.
I don’t want to think that Turkey naively believes that the UN Security Council will bomb Syria the next day after Russia changes its mind and votes for the Syria resolution. But there is no indication to think otherwise.
Another sign that Russia is not a hope at the end of the tunnel is the latest U.S.-Russia talks on Syria. The U.S. and Russia held talks this week to find a way to resolve the Syria crisis but Russia was too skeptic, with its foreign minister saying that there was only a slim chance that the leaders could come out with something that would wind down the escalating conflict in Syria.
Instead of pinning hopes on Russia, spending too much energy on proding Moscow to change its position that will only make it feel emboldened, Turkey should divert its attention to elsewhere if it wants to see Assad leave soon.
Saturday, December 8, 2012
Saturday, December 1, 2012
What if Iran goes nuclear?
Political wrangling between the U.S. and Iran over the latter’s suspected nuclear program has become less visible than a debate between those who believe a clear cut red line should be drawn before Iran and those who think Iran’s threat is hyper-inflated.
Henry Kissinger reinforced with his recent op-ed in the Washington Post calls on the U.S. government to take the Iran’s alleged rapid drive to acquire a nuclear bomb seriously as it will have profound consequences in the region that are detrimental to interests of the U.S. and its allies. He said the result of Iran going nuclear will cause an “essentially uncontrollable military nuclear proliferation” throughout a region.
He added that countries within the reach of Iran’s military but lacking a nuclear option would be driven to reorient their political alignment toward Tehran. Another setback, according to Kissinger, would be that the reformist tendencies in the Arab Spring would be submerged.
Stephen M. Walt is on the other side of the camp, favoring to cool down the rhetoric against Iran, which he thinks could be key in urging the Islamic Republic to abandon its suspected nuclear program.
He says nuclear proliferation in the region as a response to Iran’s possible development of a nuclear bomb is not what history teaches us would happen. He brings the example of Israel, South Africa (which gave up its small nuclear arsenal later) and North Korea, whose neighbors did little, if any, to go nuclear as a response.
He also dismissed Kissinger’s arguments that countries adjacent to Iran would surrender to Iran’s emboldened clout with nuclear weapons and will choose bandwagon. His example was from the Cold War, when Soviet’s nuclear threat only made NATO allies more cohesive.
Walt also believes that possessing nuclear weapons won’t prevent “reformist tendencies” to disappear as the Soviet Union's huge nuclear arsenal did little to crush massive, tandem uprisings in Eastern Europe, which eventually also brought down the Soviet Union itself.
Kissinger is right to suggest that Iran’s nuclear weapon would trigger mushrooming of nuclear weapons in the region. Realists wouldn’t be surprised to see other nations trying to re-establish their deterrence capability by developing weapons similar to what their adversaries have. The reason why Japan and South Korea didn’t attempt to build a nuclear bomb is because they are already under the nuclear umbrella of the U.S. North Korea’s building of the nuclear bomb was not an aggresive but a defensive step to protect itself from the U.S.
The case of India and Pakistan was also misleading. India’s nuclear bomb was perceived by every state in the region to be solely against Pakistan. But Iran’s case is different. Iran is not only trying to equalize its military power with Israel but also sees Turkey and Sunni Arab states as its adversaries. No state is assured of Iran’s incentives. Turks and Arabs won't consider Iran's nuclear bomb to be only aimed at Israel but to their countries as well.
Kissinger made a wrong argument when he said some states, particularly Bahrain, could bandwagon if Iran goes nuclear. Possessing nuclear weapons does not mean that Tehran will make nuclear threats to make its neighbors bow to its pressure. Taiwan is one shining example.
Theoretically Walt is correct that regional states won’t bandwagon Iran. But his example suggesting that NATO’s European allies balanced against the Soviet Union instead of succumbing to the looming Soviet threat is misleading at best. States usually bandwagon to save their country from being occupied and destroyed or to save the regime it is being ruled by. None of them would be possible if European countries chose to stay in the Soviet camp. Few Soviet allies were ruled by non-communist leaders but they still were strictly socialist, militant authorities with anti-Western agenda such as Syria and Iraq.
For the last argument regarding the reforming tendencies of the Arab Spring, my pick would be Walt. International politics is being run by rational actors (although Walt indicated in his previous blog post that uncertainty among states remains a powerful factor defining the international politics) not by masses. Grassroot movements and uprisings would not shun from doing what they think is right just because another state in the block has a devastating weapon.
I believe the primary issue here is not inflating the threat or ignoring it but how Israel, Arab states and Turkey are free riding America. It is not difficult to predict that Arab states and Turkey would be number one adversary of Iran once the U.S. stops efforts to contain Tehran. At a time when the U.S. needs to shut down expensive adventures abroad, sharing costs with allies would be a smart way to go.
Henry Kissinger reinforced with his recent op-ed in the Washington Post calls on the U.S. government to take the Iran’s alleged rapid drive to acquire a nuclear bomb seriously as it will have profound consequences in the region that are detrimental to interests of the U.S. and its allies. He said the result of Iran going nuclear will cause an “essentially uncontrollable military nuclear proliferation” throughout a region.
He added that countries within the reach of Iran’s military but lacking a nuclear option would be driven to reorient their political alignment toward Tehran. Another setback, according to Kissinger, would be that the reformist tendencies in the Arab Spring would be submerged.
Stephen M. Walt is on the other side of the camp, favoring to cool down the rhetoric against Iran, which he thinks could be key in urging the Islamic Republic to abandon its suspected nuclear program.
He says nuclear proliferation in the region as a response to Iran’s possible development of a nuclear bomb is not what history teaches us would happen. He brings the example of Israel, South Africa (which gave up its small nuclear arsenal later) and North Korea, whose neighbors did little, if any, to go nuclear as a response.
He also dismissed Kissinger’s arguments that countries adjacent to Iran would surrender to Iran’s emboldened clout with nuclear weapons and will choose bandwagon. His example was from the Cold War, when Soviet’s nuclear threat only made NATO allies more cohesive.
Walt also believes that possessing nuclear weapons won’t prevent “reformist tendencies” to disappear as the Soviet Union's huge nuclear arsenal did little to crush massive, tandem uprisings in Eastern Europe, which eventually also brought down the Soviet Union itself.
Kissinger is right to suggest that Iran’s nuclear weapon would trigger mushrooming of nuclear weapons in the region. Realists wouldn’t be surprised to see other nations trying to re-establish their deterrence capability by developing weapons similar to what their adversaries have. The reason why Japan and South Korea didn’t attempt to build a nuclear bomb is because they are already under the nuclear umbrella of the U.S. North Korea’s building of the nuclear bomb was not an aggresive but a defensive step to protect itself from the U.S.
The case of India and Pakistan was also misleading. India’s nuclear bomb was perceived by every state in the region to be solely against Pakistan. But Iran’s case is different. Iran is not only trying to equalize its military power with Israel but also sees Turkey and Sunni Arab states as its adversaries. No state is assured of Iran’s incentives. Turks and Arabs won't consider Iran's nuclear bomb to be only aimed at Israel but to their countries as well.
Kissinger made a wrong argument when he said some states, particularly Bahrain, could bandwagon if Iran goes nuclear. Possessing nuclear weapons does not mean that Tehran will make nuclear threats to make its neighbors bow to its pressure. Taiwan is one shining example.
Theoretically Walt is correct that regional states won’t bandwagon Iran. But his example suggesting that NATO’s European allies balanced against the Soviet Union instead of succumbing to the looming Soviet threat is misleading at best. States usually bandwagon to save their country from being occupied and destroyed or to save the regime it is being ruled by. None of them would be possible if European countries chose to stay in the Soviet camp. Few Soviet allies were ruled by non-communist leaders but they still were strictly socialist, militant authorities with anti-Western agenda such as Syria and Iraq.
For the last argument regarding the reforming tendencies of the Arab Spring, my pick would be Walt. International politics is being run by rational actors (although Walt indicated in his previous blog post that uncertainty among states remains a powerful factor defining the international politics) not by masses. Grassroot movements and uprisings would not shun from doing what they think is right just because another state in the block has a devastating weapon.
I believe the primary issue here is not inflating the threat or ignoring it but how Israel, Arab states and Turkey are free riding America. It is not difficult to predict that Arab states and Turkey would be number one adversary of Iran once the U.S. stops efforts to contain Tehran. At a time when the U.S. needs to shut down expensive adventures abroad, sharing costs with allies would be a smart way to go.
Tuesday, November 27, 2012
Israel planned to give Gaza back to Egypt by recent bombing
As many suggested, Israel’s military operation in Gaza named “Pillar of Defense” was not about upcoming Israeli elections or Iran; it was simply Israel’s hobby and a part of its perennial goal to make Gaza a part of Egypt not Palestine.
In the course of the eight-day Gaza war, dozens of analyses appeared in mainstream newspapers and blogs, suggesting that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was garnering political capital to boost his electoral votes in upcoming elections in January.
Arab and Turkish leaders were quick to accuse the Israeli leader of making electoral calculations at the expense of blood of Gazan children. In the words of Turkish President Abdullah Gül, Netanyahu was making “a bloody electoral investment.”
Differential analyses resurfaced in some media outlets, including the New York Times, citing US and Israeli officials as saying that the Gaza operation was a mini model of a possible Iran operation in the future and constituted war games to observe how the nation was prepared to long-range, much more dangerous Iranian rockets no doubt would start showering on Tel-Aviv in case of an armed confrontation.
The claim that Netanyahu was bidding for reelection with its Gaza operation is plain wrong. No leader would take the risk of starting a war with unknown consequences unless he knows that it is a matter of political survival and that he has nothing to lose not going down the path. Netanyahu and co. are well aware that the prime minister will easily win in the January poll.
In addition, Netanyahu is not ruling the country alone. The Gaza operation was planned and implemented by the coalition government. Coalition partners – Netanyahu’s rivals -- would not pave the way for the prime minister to get one step ahead of them in the election in two months.
There was also very little, if any, criticism from inside Israel, that would put pressure on the government to halt the Gaza operation. A recent survey published by the Haaretz revealed that striking 84 percent of Israelis were backing the Gaza operation. This is a clear evidence that few in Israel believe that Gaza operation was Netanyahu's electoral calculation.
Claims that Gaza operation was about a future attack on Iran’s nuclear sites also have many fallacies. Israel doesn’t need hundreds of rockets to be fired into its territory to see how its rocket interceptors are working. There is a thing called “military drill.”
Many analysts slammed Israel’s Gaza operation for being a futile attempt to stem rocket attacks from Gaza and argued that the military offensive doesn’t add to Israel’s security. They are right. But it was not Israel’s goal to launch a wide offensive to stop few harmless rockets.
All these speculations helped Israel cover behind its primary goal, not secret to anyone anymore, which is to bury two-state solution and making realities on the ground even more incompatible for an independent Palestinian state. An important part of this plan is to tear Gaza and West Bank apart, make two peoples living there feel alienated and more importantly to make Gazans consider themselves a part of Egypt rather than Palestine.
Giving Gaza back to Egypt will help Israel get rid of nearly 2 million Palestinians, a huge favor for a bi-national Israeli state threatened by a growing number of Palestinians.
The plan seems to be working: The U.S. praised Egypt for its role in mediation. Israel okayed Egypt’s staunch backing of Gaza and agreed to see Egypt a guarantor of the Gaza truce.
“We don’t trust on Israel but we trust on our Egyptian brothers,” Hamas spokesman told a TV channel after the ceasefire was agreed. This was the sentence Israel wanted Hamas to say.
In the course of the eight-day Gaza war, dozens of analyses appeared in mainstream newspapers and blogs, suggesting that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was garnering political capital to boost his electoral votes in upcoming elections in January.
Arab and Turkish leaders were quick to accuse the Israeli leader of making electoral calculations at the expense of blood of Gazan children. In the words of Turkish President Abdullah Gül, Netanyahu was making “a bloody electoral investment.”
Differential analyses resurfaced in some media outlets, including the New York Times, citing US and Israeli officials as saying that the Gaza operation was a mini model of a possible Iran operation in the future and constituted war games to observe how the nation was prepared to long-range, much more dangerous Iranian rockets no doubt would start showering on Tel-Aviv in case of an armed confrontation.
The claim that Netanyahu was bidding for reelection with its Gaza operation is plain wrong. No leader would take the risk of starting a war with unknown consequences unless he knows that it is a matter of political survival and that he has nothing to lose not going down the path. Netanyahu and co. are well aware that the prime minister will easily win in the January poll.
In addition, Netanyahu is not ruling the country alone. The Gaza operation was planned and implemented by the coalition government. Coalition partners – Netanyahu’s rivals -- would not pave the way for the prime minister to get one step ahead of them in the election in two months.
There was also very little, if any, criticism from inside Israel, that would put pressure on the government to halt the Gaza operation. A recent survey published by the Haaretz revealed that striking 84 percent of Israelis were backing the Gaza operation. This is a clear evidence that few in Israel believe that Gaza operation was Netanyahu's electoral calculation.
Claims that Gaza operation was about a future attack on Iran’s nuclear sites also have many fallacies. Israel doesn’t need hundreds of rockets to be fired into its territory to see how its rocket interceptors are working. There is a thing called “military drill.”
Many analysts slammed Israel’s Gaza operation for being a futile attempt to stem rocket attacks from Gaza and argued that the military offensive doesn’t add to Israel’s security. They are right. But it was not Israel’s goal to launch a wide offensive to stop few harmless rockets.
All these speculations helped Israel cover behind its primary goal, not secret to anyone anymore, which is to bury two-state solution and making realities on the ground even more incompatible for an independent Palestinian state. An important part of this plan is to tear Gaza and West Bank apart, make two peoples living there feel alienated and more importantly to make Gazans consider themselves a part of Egypt rather than Palestine.
Giving Gaza back to Egypt will help Israel get rid of nearly 2 million Palestinians, a huge favor for a bi-national Israeli state threatened by a growing number of Palestinians.
The plan seems to be working: The U.S. praised Egypt for its role in mediation. Israel okayed Egypt’s staunch backing of Gaza and agreed to see Egypt a guarantor of the Gaza truce.
“We don’t trust on Israel but we trust on our Egyptian brothers,” Hamas spokesman told a TV channel after the ceasefire was agreed. This was the sentence Israel wanted Hamas to say.
Monday, November 5, 2012
Erdoğan’s lira zone: Nationalism or economy?
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has plunged Turkey’s agenda into another useless debate in which, no matter how much less sense the idea makes, his supporters threw weight behind it.
It came in Berlin, where Erdoğan said Turkey will not join the eurozone once it is the member of the European Union, in first such a public proclamation by a high-level Turkish official. He proposed Turkish “lira zone” to emphasize confidence of neighboring countries in Turkish economy and an implicit comparison between Turkish economy and the eurozone economies.
No doubt Erdoğan’s statement is a clear expression of his nationalistic views rather than a thought-provoking economic idea that could help find a solution to Turkey’s deepening crisis in closing gaps in current account deficit, growing cleavage of export-import imbalance and high energy costs that in turn makes virtually everything in the country more expensive and thus drives up already soaring inflation.
Erdoğan attacked the euro as the chief culprit of the economic crisis in the southern belt of the eurozone and overlooked the significance of “zone” that shares most of the eurozone’s woes. His proposal to create another zone is a clear evidence that he sees the euro as a currency being sick not the eurozone.
Euro remains one of the strongest and most stable currency in the world. Although it is not as much used in financial transactions across the globe as the U.S. dollar, many countries still view it reliable to hold large reserves of euro as foreign currency as a way of stabilizing their economy.
The primary problem at the heart of the eurozone crisis is that the area has one currency with many fiscal policies and countries that are in deep recession like Spain and Greece have hard times in digesting top-bottom austerity policies imposed by heavyweights like Germany and France upon them.
Erdoğan’s proposal to create a Turkish lira zone has little if any benefit to Turkey’s economic woes. Turkey could create strong Turkish lira only by abandoning protectionist measures that will also set away its current account deficit problem. It could hence create strong Turkish lira that might be used in neighboring countries as the third currency. It could export more Turkish lira from its economy to neighboring countries if need be but avoid imposing on countries to adopt Turkish lira as their national currency. That would be the mistake the EU made a decade ago.
Except Iraq and Azerbaijan, most countries in Turkey’s vicinity that could be likely candidates to adopt the Turkish lira import more than their export. It means they will constantly keep exporting their foreign currency reserves. This is another reason why Turkish lira would be in worse crisis once neighboring countries keep using it.
There is a reason why American dollars remain the king of currencies. It is because it is being used only in one country, which is democratic and has very vibrant, liberal economy.
It came in Berlin, where Erdoğan said Turkey will not join the eurozone once it is the member of the European Union, in first such a public proclamation by a high-level Turkish official. He proposed Turkish “lira zone” to emphasize confidence of neighboring countries in Turkish economy and an implicit comparison between Turkish economy and the eurozone economies.
No doubt Erdoğan’s statement is a clear expression of his nationalistic views rather than a thought-provoking economic idea that could help find a solution to Turkey’s deepening crisis in closing gaps in current account deficit, growing cleavage of export-import imbalance and high energy costs that in turn makes virtually everything in the country more expensive and thus drives up already soaring inflation.
Erdoğan attacked the euro as the chief culprit of the economic crisis in the southern belt of the eurozone and overlooked the significance of “zone” that shares most of the eurozone’s woes. His proposal to create another zone is a clear evidence that he sees the euro as a currency being sick not the eurozone.
Euro remains one of the strongest and most stable currency in the world. Although it is not as much used in financial transactions across the globe as the U.S. dollar, many countries still view it reliable to hold large reserves of euro as foreign currency as a way of stabilizing their economy.
The primary problem at the heart of the eurozone crisis is that the area has one currency with many fiscal policies and countries that are in deep recession like Spain and Greece have hard times in digesting top-bottom austerity policies imposed by heavyweights like Germany and France upon them.
Erdoğan’s proposal to create a Turkish lira zone has little if any benefit to Turkey’s economic woes. Turkey could create strong Turkish lira only by abandoning protectionist measures that will also set away its current account deficit problem. It could hence create strong Turkish lira that might be used in neighboring countries as the third currency. It could export more Turkish lira from its economy to neighboring countries if need be but avoid imposing on countries to adopt Turkish lira as their national currency. That would be the mistake the EU made a decade ago.
Except Iraq and Azerbaijan, most countries in Turkey’s vicinity that could be likely candidates to adopt the Turkish lira import more than their export. It means they will constantly keep exporting their foreign currency reserves. This is another reason why Turkish lira would be in worse crisis once neighboring countries keep using it.
There is a reason why American dollars remain the king of currencies. It is because it is being used only in one country, which is democratic and has very vibrant, liberal economy.
Wednesday, October 31, 2012
How to bypass spending in FP: Make others do your job
Only days left to the key U.S. presidential race and one wonders if the U.S. foreign policy will make a significant shift in case either candidates get to the White House. This is hardly the choice the U.S. president will make in the middle of painful economic recovery.
The biggest challenge faces the U.S. abroad is not Iran driving to acquire a nuclear weapon or China that is building huge economy and military muscle. It is its own economy that is having hard time to find necessary money to fund its foreign policy establishment and military – key for conducting an effective foreign policy.
The reason why the U.S. economy is recovering so slowly is because the Obama administration, departing from tax cut policy for increased production the federal government had been pursuing since 1981, has started spending on budget deficit, coupled with expensive Health Care spending that is signed into law in 2010. The price tag of entitlements – public spending Washington can’t give up – will become much bigger burden for taxpayers as the U.S. enters into a new era where aged people will fast close the gap with younger, working generation thanks to the fact that 1946-1964 “baby boom” generation is turning to 65.One of them is U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The U.S. will have to shrink its military spending, foreign aid and an array of foreign policy initiatives it is implementing thanks to these spending.
There is a very effective way for the U.S. to overcome this troubled trend in economy that will squeeze its foreign policy spending: Make others do what you had been doing all along.
Broadening close partnerships with allies, eliminating possible threats and avoiding expensive initiatives such as Iraq quagmire is going to make up the backbone of the U.S. foreign policy moves. Washington’s limited options vis-a-vis Arab countries demanding transformation of their nations have already showed to what extend the U.S. could reach in realizing its goals.
At least in the next four years, the U.S. will work more closely with allies and share costs with them in national security challenges. “Leading behind” policy in Libya, working closely with Turkey and Qatar in the Syria crisis and establishing a broad coalition of states to impose crippling sanctions on Iran are policies the Obama administration was successful in pursuing that saved it billions of dollars.
No matter who wins the White House in this November elections, the new president will have to work more with allies to share costs abroad. The new president will face growing budget deficit and more burden on taxpayers. Although Romney vows to increase military spending despite economic challenges, it is hard to believe that he will go that path along. Cutting military spending will hardly change the conduct of the U.S. military around the world because the waste in the U.S. army is rampant. In these circumstances, it is not hard to estimate that the U.S. will choose to work more with allies, avoid costly adventures abroad rather than playing solo.
The biggest challenge faces the U.S. abroad is not Iran driving to acquire a nuclear weapon or China that is building huge economy and military muscle. It is its own economy that is having hard time to find necessary money to fund its foreign policy establishment and military – key for conducting an effective foreign policy.
The reason why the U.S. economy is recovering so slowly is because the Obama administration, departing from tax cut policy for increased production the federal government had been pursuing since 1981, has started spending on budget deficit, coupled with expensive Health Care spending that is signed into law in 2010. The price tag of entitlements – public spending Washington can’t give up – will become much bigger burden for taxpayers as the U.S. enters into a new era where aged people will fast close the gap with younger, working generation thanks to the fact that 1946-1964 “baby boom” generation is turning to 65.
There is a very effective way for the U.S. to overcome this troubled trend in economy that will squeeze its foreign policy spending: Make others do what you had been doing all along.
Broadening close partnerships with allies, eliminating possible threats and avoiding expensive initiatives such as Iraq quagmire is going to make up the backbone of the U.S. foreign policy moves. Washington’s limited options vis-a-vis Arab countries demanding transformation of their nations have already showed to what extend the U.S. could reach in realizing its goals.
At least in the next four years, the U.S. will work more closely with allies and share costs with them in national security challenges. “Leading behind” policy in Libya, working closely with Turkey and Qatar in the Syria crisis and establishing a broad coalition of states to impose crippling sanctions on Iran are policies the Obama administration was successful in pursuing that saved it billions of dollars.
No matter who wins the White House in this November elections, the new president will have to work more with allies to share costs abroad. The new president will face growing budget deficit and more burden on taxpayers. Although Romney vows to increase military spending despite economic challenges, it is hard to believe that he will go that path along. Cutting military spending will hardly change the conduct of the U.S. military around the world because the waste in the U.S. army is rampant. In these circumstances, it is not hard to estimate that the U.S. will choose to work more with allies, avoid costly adventures abroad rather than playing solo.
Wednesday, October 24, 2012
States need U.S. partnership not leadership
U.S.
presidential candidates, in their final debate on Monday that was focused on
foreign policy, made it clear to their voters that they will be better
presidents in leading America in key parts of the world without knowing what
kind of negative consequences it might entail.
One wonders
how the next president is going to make it happen giving constraints of the
U.S. power following two devastating wars in the Middle East and numerous
falling initiatives. In the debate, Obama used the word “leadership” for 15
times while Romney said it eight times. It certainly brings votes to say
America is going to lead the world to peace and prosperity but at the same time
it creates discord in various parts of the world against the U.S. role.
No state can
accept leadership of another state unless it is under grave threat of
destruction and any attempt to create leadership over others has always had backlash.
There is no such thing called “American leadership that will bring peace and
prosperity” as Romney kept repeating in the debate. States, as usual, will
always keep fighting and the U.S. must pick a smart strategy to turn the tide
into its favor. This could include pitting emerging powers against each other
to make sure that no nation is dominating others in a region they are located.
Another strategy is to make brief intervention to change the course of events
rather than trying to run a country. The U.S. is good at changing the course of
history but it is bad at running other nations.
When you
boast of a military spending that is more than military spending of next ten
countries combined, then you should be ready to see other countries worried
about your military might and intentions.
The U.S. is the most powerful nation on Earth and it can defeat any
state it wants in any part of the world. When this kind of tremendous power
shows signs of leadership role in any regional challenges it faces, it will be
met with resistance rather than welcome. States will only welcome the alliance
and partnership of the U.S. as long as they know that the U.S. has no
expansionist ambitions.
When you
talk about leadership in the East Asia, this is definitely not good news for
both China and its adversaries. The U.S. must continue to leave nations
surrounding China weak to the extent of being only defend themselves to make
sure that Japan and other states don’t dominate the region as it was the
situation before the World War II. The U.S. should stay vigilant against
Chinese expansion as well as maintain the current balance of power in the
Pacific region with delicate partnerships rather than speaking about being a
leader in the region.
The same
goes with the Middle East too. Neither Turkey nor Egypt want U.S. leadership
but both powerful countries wouldn’t want to see their ambitions being realized
without the U.S. giving a helping hand to them.
All in all,
the U.S. will continue to increase its presence in the Middle East and East
Asia no matter who will be elected to the White House. But the U.S. should aim
to prevent any state to dominate regions that are very significant to U.S.
interests, including its own domination. Taking a leadership role in the Middle
East and the East Asia won’t help Washington to promote its interests and
instead will turn friendly nations balancing against the world’s superpower.
Saturday, September 1, 2012
Why no one cares about Syria safe zone
For most part of the uprising, the entire world has stared at Turkey’s mouth to see if Ankara spells out a possible buffer zone inside Syria that would be a safe haven for the armed opposition. Today, Turkey demands it but no one cares.
I’m not particularly surprised to see such a situation develop because states rarely act when the issue in question is humanitarian. Insistently clamoring for a “liberated territory” in Syria was largely driven by a success in Libya where eastern city of Benghazi, the heart of the Libyan revolution, played a key role in organization of the armed revolution that ousted late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi a year ago. Absence of such a territory in Syria made it hard for the armed opposition to receive arms from outside and also establish an effective transitional government that would facilitate the diplomatic overtures abroad and coordinate armed groups inside the war-torn country.
Turkey, finally, demanded before the United Nations Security Council on Thursday to establish a safe zone inside Syria as it was inundated with growing number of Syrian refugees fleeing from the violence in Syria. Security Council, Secretary’s office and even the U.S. were reluctant to go down the path of calling for safe zones along with Turkey. “I was wrong with my expectations,” Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu told the Security Council in a disappointment.
But why are the major powers too reluctant to establish a buffer zone when there is growing legitimacy in this end and historic opportunity to aid the rebels? The answer is simple: Possible buffer zone in Syria is humanitarian and not about the revolution anymore.
The U.S. claims that the crisis has a humanitarian dimension but it is largely a political crisis because the deaths and violence are caused by the Syrian regime. European nations and the U.S. pledged little financial aid for the fleeing refugees. Washington also seems very unwilling to nod to the Turkish-French initative to establish a buffer zone inside Syria – the last thing Obama administration wants to deal with months before key presidential elections.
Journalists, activists and some states claim that the Syrian opposition control large swathes of areas on the Turkish border, creating a de facto buffer zone, which also leaves outside help in this regard largely unnecessary. Any military intervention by NATO or by the coalition of the willing to establish the buffer zone inside Syria will do little to aid the rebels in advancing their cause and instead will create additional strains with Russia, China and prompt unexpected retaliation by the Syrian government. A realist would not be surprised to see such a situation where states don’t act if the matter is solely humanitarian.
I’m not particularly surprised to see such a situation develop because states rarely act when the issue in question is humanitarian. Insistently clamoring for a “liberated territory” in Syria was largely driven by a success in Libya where eastern city of Benghazi, the heart of the Libyan revolution, played a key role in organization of the armed revolution that ousted late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi a year ago. Absence of such a territory in Syria made it hard for the armed opposition to receive arms from outside and also establish an effective transitional government that would facilitate the diplomatic overtures abroad and coordinate armed groups inside the war-torn country.
Turkey, finally, demanded before the United Nations Security Council on Thursday to establish a safe zone inside Syria as it was inundated with growing number of Syrian refugees fleeing from the violence in Syria. Security Council, Secretary’s office and even the U.S. were reluctant to go down the path of calling for safe zones along with Turkey. “I was wrong with my expectations,” Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu told the Security Council in a disappointment.
But why are the major powers too reluctant to establish a buffer zone when there is growing legitimacy in this end and historic opportunity to aid the rebels? The answer is simple: Possible buffer zone in Syria is humanitarian and not about the revolution anymore.
The U.S. claims that the crisis has a humanitarian dimension but it is largely a political crisis because the deaths and violence are caused by the Syrian regime. European nations and the U.S. pledged little financial aid for the fleeing refugees. Washington also seems very unwilling to nod to the Turkish-French initative to establish a buffer zone inside Syria – the last thing Obama administration wants to deal with months before key presidential elections.
Journalists, activists and some states claim that the Syrian opposition control large swathes of areas on the Turkish border, creating a de facto buffer zone, which also leaves outside help in this regard largely unnecessary. Any military intervention by NATO or by the coalition of the willing to establish the buffer zone inside Syria will do little to aid the rebels in advancing their cause and instead will create additional strains with Russia, China and prompt unexpected retaliation by the Syrian government. A realist would not be surprised to see such a situation where states don’t act if the matter is solely humanitarian.
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